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Donald proposes that early Homo evolved mimesis as a new form of cognition. This
article investigates the mimesis hypothesis in relation to the evolution of teaching. The
fundamental capacities that distinguish hominin teaching from that of other animals
are demonstration and pantomime. A conceptual analysis of the instructional and
communicative functions of demonstration and pantomime is presented. Archaeological
evidence that demonstration was used for transmitting the Oldowan technology is
summarized. It is argued that pantomime develops out of demonstration so that the
primary objective of pantomime is that the onlooker learns the motoric patterns shown
in the pantomime. The communicative use of pantomime is judged to be secondary. This
use of pantomime is also contrasted with other forms of gestures. A key feature of the
analysis is that the meaning of a pantomime is characterized by the force patterns of the
movements. These force patterns form the core of a model of the cognitive mechanism
behind pantomime. Finally, the role of pantomime in the evolution of language is also
discussed.
Keywords: demonstration, evolution of language, gesture, mental simulation, mimesis, pantomime, teaching
INTRODUCTION
Donald (1991, 2001) formulates a ‘mimesis hypothesis’, which states that a specific form of
cognition (and a corresponding culture) mediated between that of the ancestor we have in common
with the apes and that of modern humans. In brief, Donald proposes that while ape culture is based
on associational learning, early Homo evolved a new form of cognition. The basis for this was that
the body could be used volitionally to do what somebody else is doing (imitation), to represent
external events for the purpose of communication (mime, gesture) and to rehearse a given skill by
matching performance to a goal.
Donald (2012) expands the mimesis hypothesis and emphasizes that a key feature of the human
memory system is our ability to voluntarily retrieve a particular memory. He notes: “Nonhuman
animals can learn skills with appropriate conditioning, but their performance can be retrieved only
by external cues that elicit conditioned responses. Voluntary recall, as in self-triggered conscious
retrieval, the kind of recall needed to practice a skill, is absent” (Donald, 2012, p. 275). The ability
to initiate the internal cuing process that triggers a memory of a previous performance he calls
‘autocuing’. His thesis can help explain why one finds evidence of apprenticeship among the
hominins, but not in the apes or other non-human animals (Sterelny, 2012).
Humans do not only engage in rehearsal, they also teach extensively. In contrast, there is very
restricted evidence concerning intentional teaching in non-human animals. A central question
is: How did intentional teaching evolve along the hominin line? This article focuses on the
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role of mimesis in that process. A starting point is the analysis
of teaching in Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017) where five
levels of intentional teaching are distinguished: (1) evaluative
feedback (approval and disapproval), (2) drawing attention,
(3) demonstrating (showing how to do), (4) communicating
concepts (teaching categories), and (5) explaining relationships
between concepts. The analysis is summarized in Section
“Evolutionary Levels of Teaching”. A crucial step separating
humans from other animals is ‘showing how to do’.
I will expand on this analysis by providing an analysis
of two forms of mimesis involved in showing how to do,
namely, demonstration and pantomime (see Demonstration
and Pantomime). Archaeological evidence for early uses of
demonstration will also be presented briefly. Pantomime will
then be put in contrast with other forms of gestures in
Section “Relations between Pantomime and Gesture”. I argue
that the meaning of a pantomime is characterized by the
force patterns of the movements. In Section “The Cognitive
Mechanism of Pantomime”, a model of the cognitive mechanism
behind pantomime is presented. I suggest that the human mind
adds representations of forces when planning and imagining
actions. “Enactment and the Evolution of Communication” then
discusses the role of pantomime in the evolution of language.
EVOLUTIONARY LEVELS OF TEACHING
Imitation and Emulation
Individuals, human or non-human, can learn without being
taught. An individual can learn by him/herself, but often the
learning takes place in a social context. In social learning, the
learning individual observes the behavior of a knowledgeable
individual (the model), while the model does not adapt its
behavior to make it easier for the first individual to learn
(Nielsen et al., 2012). An example is the nut-cracking behavior
of chimpanzees (Boesch and Boesch, 1982; Biro et al., 2006). It
can take up to four years for adolescent chimpanzees to learn
from adults and become proficient at cracking open palm nuts
with stone hammers and anvils. Adults rarely help to correct
hammering techniques or encourage the young.
Tomasello (1999) distinguishes between learning by
emulation, where the learner observes the outcomes of the
model’s actions and tries to reach the same outcome (goal-
oriented learning), and learning by imitation, where the learner
observes the sequence of the model’s actions and tries to perform
the same actions (process-oriented learning) (see also Zentall,
2001; Tehrani and Riede, 2008).
The ‘artificial fruit’ experiments by Whiten et al. (2005) have
been designed to investigate the differences between emulation
and imitation. Early results indicated that chimpanzees emulate
while children imitate, but later studies suggest that the situation
is more complicated (Horowitz, 2003; Whiten et al., 2009).
Imitating the use of familiar motor actions in novel situations
also seem to be easier for chimpanzees than copying new motor
actions (Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa, 1999). Froese and
Leavens (2014) argue that, in many situations, chimpanzees as
well as children directly perceive the intention of the model and
that they emulate in such situations. Children, and to some
extent chimpanzees (Buttelmann et al., 2007) imitate when an
action is constrained by conventions (or just arbitrarily made up)
so that the intention of the model cannot be perceived. Froese
and Leavens (2014) predict that the more an action relies on
conventions, the more faithfully it will be imitated.
The apprenticeship culture that evolved among hominins
(Sterelny, 2012), presumes a well-established ability to rehearse.
But even though rehearsal is best seen as a form of self-imitation –
I remember how I performed a sequence of actions last time and
what the outcome was, now I can try to improve on my previous
performance – it is cognitively different from imitation. Self-
imitation depends on autocuing of memories (Donald, 2012).
Levels of Intentional Teaching
Learning by imitation and emulation does normally not involve
any form of teaching intention on the part of the model. In
contrast, demonstration and pantomime are intentional forms
of teaching. I next present a summary of the five levels of
intentional teaching in Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017) (for
another classification of teaching, see Kline, 2015).
(1) Evaluative Feedback
The teacher approves or disapproves of the learner’s behavior
(Castro and Toro, 2004). For example, if the learner is about
to eat a poisonous plant, the teacher may show disapproval of
this and thereby the learner will hopefully learn to avoid that
kind of food. Animal data on this form of teaching include
chimpanzee mothers taking away dangerous food from infants,
and gorilla, chimpanzee and macaque mothers facilitating
and encouraging infants’ independent locomotion (Maestripieri,
1995, 1996; Whiten, 1999).
(2) Drawing Attention
Here, the teacher’s intention is that the learner focuses on a
particular object, action or feature. Among humans, drawing
attention is often achieved by pointing (but other methods are
also used). Non-human animals draw attention in particular via
alarm calls. However, in most cases these signals seem to be non-
intentional and not dependent on what the conspecifics know and
do not know (although see Crockford et al., 2012). Several bird
species, including hens of domestic fowl, peck at the ground and
call chickens to draw attention to suitable food (Nicol and Pope,
1996).
(3) Demonstrating
This involves intentionally showing somebody else how to
perform a task or how to solve a problem. Demonstrating
builds on advanced mindreading both for the teacher and for
the learner. It presumes that the teacher understands the lack
of knowledge in the learner and that the learner experiences
that there is something to learn. This kind of teaching also
requires that the teacher and the learner jointly attend to the
demonstration.
(4) Communicating Concepts
For example, teaching categorizations of plants or animals is an
important form of transmission of knowledge. In modern human
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societies, the main method to teach a concept is to use a word
(or gestural sign) standing for the concept together with pointing
or some other technique for drawing the attention to what falls
under the category. Concept teaching relies on mindreading
since it presumes that the learner understands that the teacher is
intentionally using a gesture or a sound as a communicative sign,
that is, that the gesture or sound is used to ‘stand for’ something
else (Zlatev et al., 2005a) (see Enactment and the Evolution of
Communication).
(5) Explaining Relationships between Concepts
The teacher’s intention in explaining is typically that the learner
understands the causal relationship between two concepts. For
example, if this arrow is dipped in poison, then it will kill an
animal that it hits, and wet wood is not good for lighting a fire.
Unlike the previous ones, this level presumes that the teacher uses
a symbolic language (spoken or gestured) that can refer to things
that are not present in the teaching situation.
For all five levels, it is assumed that the teacher has an
intention that the learner learns something that s/he would
not learn without the intervention of the teacher. Gärdenfors
and Högberg (2017) analyze the requirements concerning
mindreading (theory of mind) for each of the five levels. As
one goes up the levels, the requirements on communication
capacities also increase. In particular, level 5 requires symbolic
communication, while indexical or iconic gesturing may be
sufficient for levels 2–4 (see Relations between Pantomime and
Gesture).
Most of the teaching of non-human animals is non-
intentional, but there are cases of intentional teaching on levels
(1) and (2). With one possible exception (see below), it is only
humans who have been shown to teach according to levels (3–5).
This leads to the central question of why only hominins have
the capacity to demonstrate, that is, to reach level (3). This
capacity seems to have generated a breakthrough in hominin
teaching and in transmission of culture. Before the question can
be approached, a conceptual analysis of ‘showing how to do’ is
necessary. In the following section, this capacity will be divided
into two related forms of enactment, namely, demonstration and
pantomime.
DEMONSTRATION AND PANTOMIME
The Structure of Demonstration
Demonstrating involves intentionally showing somebody else
how to perform a task or to solve a problem. Demonstration
is a central element in ‘natural pedagogy’ and seems to be
present in all human societies (Csibra and Gergely, 2009, 2011).
Showing a child how a toy functions, how to brush her teeth
or how to tie her shoelaces are well-known everyday examples.
Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017) argue that demonstration was
already used in teaching the 2.5 million year old Oldowan
stone knapping technology (see Archaeological Evidence for
Demonstration below) and that learning this technology does not
presume any symbolic form of communication (see Enactment
and the Evolution of Communication).
When a teacher demonstrates to a learner how to perform a
certain task, the following criteria are characteristic:
(D1) The demonstrator actually performs the actions
involved in the task.
(D2) The demonstrator makes sure that the learner attends to
the series of actions.
(D3) The demonstrator’s intention is that the learner can
perceive the right actions in the correct sequence.
(D4) The demonstrator exaggerates and slows down some
of the actions in order to facilitate for the learner to
perceive important features.
When the learner tries to imitate the demonstrated action,
the teacher reacts with approval or disapproval (level 1).
A demonstration may or may not be accompanied with verbal
comments. There is typically some form of feedback, maybe just
a nod of the head, from the learner, indicating that he or she has
understood what is being demonstrated.
In criterion (D1), it is presupposed that the performance
is voluntary, that is, autocued in the sense of Donald (2012).
As regards criterion (D2), Csibra and Gergely (2009, p. 149)
point out that “human communication is often preceded, or
accompanied, by ostensive signals that (i) disambiguate that the
subsequent action (for example, a tool-use demonstration) is
intended to be communicative and (ii) specify the addressee
to whom the communication is addressed”. Gergely et al.
(2007) provide experimental evidence for the importance of the
ostensive nature of the teacher’s behavior.
Criteria (D2) and (D3) entail that demonstrating builds on
advanced mindreading both for the teacher and for the learner.
The most efficient (and the typical) way to satisfy (D2) is that the
teacher and the learner achieve joint attention, but other means of
making the learner attend are also possible. As mentioned in the
previous section, (D3) presumes that the teacher understands the
lack of knowledge in the learner and that the learner experiences
that there is something to learn.
It should be noted that demonstration is not confined to direct
teaching but can also be used in other situations. One pertinent
example is that after training, an apprentice can demonstrate to a
teacher or bystanders that she has learned to perform a particular
task. Another example is as part of certain forms of narrative,
say in a court case, where a witness demonstrates how somebody
behaved (the border line between this and pantomime may be
vague in this case).
As a comment on (D4), it should be noted that demonstration
presumes that the learner will learn by imitation rather than
by emulation. It not only the goal of the demonstration that is
important but the sequence of actions leading to it. Highlighting
initial and final states of an action helps the learner to segment the
sequence of actions as well as the preconditions for the initiation
of the action and the properties of its final result.
When demonstrating in front of children, adults exaggerate
their movements, they emphasize the beginning and end of
movements and they pause before and after the task. In addition
to establishing joint intention, this is also part of the ostensive
signals that a teacher uses to control the attention of the learner
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(see Gergely et al., 2007). This form of demonstration has been
called Motionese (Brand et al., 2002; Rohlfing et al., 2004). In this
way, children are assisted in processing and interpreting complex
actions.
A few observations of chimpanzees showing somebody else
how to perform an action have been reported: a chimp mother
can show her infant how to hold a stone in order to crack a nut
against an anvil stone (Boesch, 1991). I do not consider this to
be a good example of demonstration, since the mother only helps
the infant hold the stone correctly, but she does not show how
to hit the nut. Consequently, this behavior is perhaps better seen
as facilitating (which is classified as a non-intentional form of
teaching by Gärdenfors and Högberg, 2017; see also Kline, 2015).
A possible example of demonstration in non-human animals
is presented by Bates et al. (2010). African female elephants
occasionally simulate oestrus when pregnant or lactating. This
behavior occurs when a young inexperienced female behaves
inappropriately in relation to the bulls. The older females’
simulated oestrus makes it possible for them to show how the
dominant bull should be approached. The fact that the simulated
behavior is targeted only to young females in need of help possibly
qualifies it as demonstration. The behavior is rare, however, and
the evidence is not strong so it is problematic to determine to
what extent the adults understand the situation of the young
female and thereby whether conditions (D2)–(D4) are fulfilled.
Even if apes do not demonstrate themselves, they can be
taught to understand demonstration. In so-called do-as-I-do
experiments, the subjects (apes or children) are shown actions
of different kinds and they are then either asked to “do the
same thing” (if the verbal command is learned) or (if not)
the spontaneous handling of the object is recorded (Bering
et al., 2000; Bjorklund et al., 2000; Bjorklund and Bering,
2003). Mother-reared chimpanzees seem to do less well while
enculturated apes can outperform human children on certain
tasks (Tomasello et al., 1993). An explanation for this difference
could be that the mother-reared chimpanzees have been less
exposed to conventional and symbolic actions. The intentions
behind such actions are opaque and therefore emulation is
impossible (Froese and Leavens, 2014).
The Structure of Pantomime
The second form of enactment involved in teaching is
pantomime. I view pantomime as a special case – perhaps the
most central – of the mimetic ability that Donald (1991, 2001,
2012) has identified as a crucial step in human evolution.
Pantomime may have several functions (see Relations between
Pantomime and Gesture), but here I focus on pantomiming for
somebody how to perform a certain task. The following criteria
are characteristic of this function (see Arbib, 2012, pp. 218–219)
for a related analysis):
(P1) The mimer performs themovements of the actions in the
task without actually performing the actions.
(P2) The mimer makes sure that the learner attends to the
series of actions.
(P3) The mimer’s intention is that the learner can perceive the
right actions in the correct sequence.
(P4) The mimer exaggerates and slows down some of the
actions in order to facilitate for the learner to perceive
important features.
Criteria (P2)–(P4) are the same criteria as (D2)–(D4) and the
same comments as in the previous subsection apply to them. The
crucial difference is in criterion (P1), since in pantomime the
actual actions are not performed, but some more or less simplified
version of them. Again, (P1) presumes that the pantomime
is voluntary (autocued). As regards, (P3), Arbib (2012, pp.
217–218) writes: “Where imitation is the generic attempt to
reproduce movements performed by another, whether to master
a skill or simply as part of a social interaction, pantomime is
performed with the intention of getting the observer to think
of a specific action or event.” Another difference with respect
to demonstration is that pantomime is displaced in the sense of
Hockett (1960), that is, it can refer to entities not present in the
immediate environment (Zywiczynski et al., 2016, section 3.8).
For example, I can pantomime how to open a difficult door as
part of describing for you how to get into my apartment that you
are borrowing tomorrow.
It should be noted that there are degrees of pantomime. For
example, a tennis teacher can pantomime a special swing using a
racket (but not hitting a ball) or she can pantomime the swing by
just using her arm. Another example is that a boy can pantomime
a frog jumping by using his full body or by just using his hand.
When pantomiming with the hand, the body parts of the frog are
typically not represented but only the overall pattern of the frog’s
movement. Some researchers restrict pantomime to enactment
involving the whole body (e.g., Gullberg, 1998, p. 97)), but I take
a broader perspective and allow that only parts of the body are
used in a pantomime.
Many researchers see pantomiming as a form of gesturing. In
Section “Relations between Pantomime and Gesture”, I compare
pantomiming to other types of gestures. Pantomime can be used
for other purposes than teaching, for example for narrating
or as part of telling a joke. I will argue that pantomime is
primarily not used in communicative gestures. [In line with this
thesis, Zywiczynski et al. (2016) distinguish between cognitive
and communicative forms of pantomime.] Apart from teaching,
pantomime can, for example, be used in autocued rehearsal
(think of a boxer in front of a mirror) of the form discussed by
Donald (2012).
From an evolutionary perspective, an interesting question is
whether non-human animals, in particular apes, can pantomime.
Language-trained apes seem to be able to pantomime (see below
in relation to pretense). Researchers are divided on whether other
apes (wild or in captivity) have the capacity. On the one hand,
Russon and Andrews (2010, p. 316) have collected evidence for
pantomiming in orangutans. They conclude that “pantomime
could have been within the grasp of the common human-
great ape ancestor”. However, most of the evidence they analyze
conforms to the observation by Gibson (2013, p. 209) that apes
only gesture about requested actions (typically play or sex) of the
addressee. This means that what is referred to by the gesturer is
the behavior of the addressee and not some other object (see e.g.,
Boesch and Tomasello, 1998). [This analysis fits well with Reddy’s
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(2005) account of the development of sociality, which starts with
mutual attention where the attention is focused on the other
and only later develops into joint attention directed to a third
object.] On the other hand, some researchers are more skeptical,
for example Zuberbühler (2013, p. 136), who claims about apes
that “pantomiming is conspicuously absent, apart from isolated
anecdotes”.
Pantomime is a form of pretense. When you pretend, you
use two representations of the same object or action – your
perception of the object or action and an imagined version of it
(Leslie, 1987). For example, when a girl pretends that a shoe is
a telephone, she knows that it is a shoe but she simultaneously
‘sees’ it as a telephone that she can talk into. By suppressing
her perception she can use her imagination instead (see The
Cognitive Mechanism of Pantomime). Her image is a deliberately
false representation of the world. In accordance with this, Leslie
(1987) maintains that such imagined events are necessary to be
able to pretend. In the example above, the perception of the
shoe must be suppressed and the performance completed with
knowledge about telephones and how they are used that the girl
accesses from her memory. Leslie writes that small children’s
pretense play “is an early symptom of the human mind’s ability
to characterize and manipulate its own attitudes to information.
[. . .. . .] In short, pretense is an early manifestation of what has
been called a theory of mind” (Leslie, 1987, p. 416).
Clark writes about ‘depictions’ that he defines as “physical
scenes that people stage for others to use in imagining the scenes
depicted” (Clark, 2016, p. 325). It is clear that demonstration
and pantomime fall under this definition. In line with Leslie’s
argument, he writes that “depictions are the core of children’s
make-believe play” (Clark, 2016, p. 324) and he argues that
a depiction builds on a ‘double-reality principle’ since it “has
two realities: its base, or raw execution; and its appearance, the
features that are intended to be depictive” (Clark, 2016, p. 327).
There are some examples of pretense play that have been
recorded for chimpanzees and gorillas that have grown up among
humans. The bonobo Kanzi often pretends that a make-believe
dog or gorilla is biting him, or that he is pursuing and biting
someone (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998, p. 60). When he was
young, the chimpanzee Austin often pretended to be eating,
sometimes even with make-believe plate and make-believe spoon.
The second example is a clear case of pantomime.
In contrast, demonstration does not presume the double
worlds that are required for pantomime. Pantomime can be seen
as a combination of demonstration and pretense. This suggests
that demonstration puts less demand on the cognitive capacities
of the demonstrator. Hence, from both an evolutionary and
a developmental viewpoint it is reasonable that, in teaching
contexts, demonstration should appear earlier than pantomime.
Archaeological Evidence for
Demonstration
Taking an archaeological perspective, a question is what is
the earliest period of hominin history where indications of
enactment capacities can be found. A partial answer to this
question is proposed by Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017), who
argue that already the transmission of how to manufacture
Oldowan tools requires demonstration. If this argument is
correct, demonstration has been used by hominins for at least 2.5
million years.
The argument builds on the capacity to master core
maintenance, which is achieved by detaching flakes from the core
in a way that makes it possible to strike further flakes from it later.
Experimental studies have shown that core maintenance requires
planning. To learn the technique, a teacher must demonstrate a
setup that allows a flake to be detached in a way that facilitates
the detachment of another flake, which in turn facilitates for the
next flake to be detached, etc. To achieve this the teacher must
demonstrate (or pantomime) an appropriate way to hold the core
and the correct angle and movement of the arm and hand holding
a hammer stone when detaching a flake. Then the learner must
practice, typically for a long time, to master the technique.
Some researchers have claimed that the behavior of Oldowan
tool-producing hominins is also achievable by apes (Wynn et al.,
2011). Their main supporting evidence for the claim is the
knapping behavior of the bonobos Kanzi and Panbanisha, both
trained to knap by human knappers. However, Toth et al. (1993)
show that Kanzi did not achieve the skill level of Oldowan
knappers. The bonobos never voluntarily rehearsed knapping
as it had been demonstrated to them. Donald’s (2012) thesis
concerning the apes’ lack of voluntary retrieval of memories
entails that they are unable to rehearse. Kanzi only engaged in the
kind of knapping demonstrated to him when encouraged by his
teachers, or when the reward box was loaded (Toth et al., 1993).




Pantomime as a Form of Gesture
There are many different attempts to define what characterizes
gestures, some of which are very general (e.g., Armstrong
et al., 1995). Most of the definitions are not based on an
evolutionary perspective (although see Brinck, 2001 for an
analysis of the origins of pointing). Kendon’s (2004, p. 15)
definition is restricted to ‘utterance uses’ of gestures, that is,
gesture used in a communicative function, often together with
speech. Pantomime, however, also has uses that are not connected
to utterances, so a more comprehensive definition is appropriate.
Following, Zlatev et al. (2005a, p. 23), I therefore consider as
gestures “goal-directed communicative body movements, i.e.,
such that require interpretation from an audience for achieving
the gesturer’s goal”. Here I only consider representational
gestures, so that, for example, beat and emblem gestures are
excluded (Kendon, 2004, Chaps. 9–11). [In beat gestures, the
hand is used to mark the rhythm of the speech. Emblems, such
as thumbs up and the V-formed peace sign, are conventional
gestures.] Among representational gestures, a basic distinction is
between indexical gestures, where the ground is one of spatio-
temporal contiguity (e.g., pointing) and iconic gestures, where the
ground is of similarity (e.g., pantomime).
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McNeill (2013, p. 483) describes pantomime as gesture
without speech. However, vocal sounds can be parts of a
pantomime. For example, I can pantomime an up-and-down
movement by changes in the pitch of my voice or imitate
the sound of an animal while pantomiming its movements.
Furthermore, this characterization brings out a tension in the
origin of pantomime. McNeill and other gesture researchers
describe pantomime in terms of communication, while my
position if that the primary function of pantomime is non-
communicative.
This distinction also shows up when determining what is
the intention of a pantomime. There seem to be two different
types: Firstly, I can pantomime an action that I want you
to copy. This is the typical case in a teaching situation.
Secondly, I can pantomime an action as part of a message
(request, command, warning, narrative, etc.). In the gesture
literature, the second use of pantomime (communicative act)
seems to have been in focus and it is this meaning that is
used when pantomime as an art is referred to. Here, I am
mainly interested in the first use. According to the proposed
definition, a demonstration is also a gesture, but it is only used
for the first type of intention. However, since pantomime can
also be used for the second type, it has a broader use than
demonstration.
Even though the evidence for pantomiming apes is weak,
they are capable of producing other forms of gestures. Non-
human gestures are typically dyadic, where only two individuals
are involved, but no external object [although see Pika and
Bugnyar (2011) on referential gestures in ravens]; for example
when an ape gestures where it wants to be groomed or
to show which copulation position it desires (Tanner and
Byrne, 1996; Zlatev et al., 2005a; Pollick and de Waal, 2007).
An example of a triadic gesture is a human pointing to
an object in the presence of another individual in order
to achieve joint attention (see The Cognitive Mechanism of
Pantomime).
Semantic Domains of Gestures
McNeill (1992) distinguishes between character viewpoint
gestures, where the one who gestures enacts the movements of
the object (e.g., showing how a fish was trying to swim away
when it was on your hook), and observer viewpoint gestures,
where the one who gestures relates to the object from the outside
(e.g., showing how big the fish was by enacting touching its
head and tail) (see also Gullberg, 1998; Parrill, 2009). Gestures
for object properties are typically observer viewpoint gestures,
while gestures for actions are typically character viewpoint
gestures. Pantomime clearly belongs to character viewpoint
gestures.
A characteristic aspect of pantomimes is that they express
actions. This point can be clarified by considering the semantic
domains of different types of gestures. In Gärdenfors (2014), I
argue that for adjectives, verbs and prepositions, the meaning
of a single word only depends on a single semantic domain.
For example, ‘red’ refers to a region of color space, ‘push’ to a
region of vectors in force space, and ‘near’ to a region of physical
space.
A version of the hypothesis can also be extended to the
semantics of gestures. There exist three types of representational
gestures corresponding to three different types of semantic
domains:
(i) Location. This involves the domain of physical space,
which is the characteristic referential domain for pointing
gestures.
(ii) Object Properties. Gestures can represent the shape, size,
length, height, depth and maybe other properties of an
object. These properties each belong to an object category
domain (Gärdenfors, 2014, Ch. 6).
(iii) Actions. According to the analysis presented in previous
work (Gärdenfors, 2007, 2014, Chap. 8; Gärdenfors and
Warglien, 2012), actions can be represented as patterns of
forces. The underlying semantic domain for this kind of
gesture is thus the force domain.
The importance of the domain analysis is that a pantomime
can now be characterized as a gesture that for its semantic
function principally involves the force domain. If I am
pantomiming the jumping of a frog, my hand or my full body
will exhibit some typical force pattern of a frog’s movement.
In this way, the represented action is iconically enacted.
This analysis accords with Kendon’s (2004, p. 160), since he
identifies pantomime with enactment that is oriented toward
actions.
The domain analysis presented here is complicated by the fact
that a pantomime can be combined with information about the
properties of an object that is part of the depicted event. For
example, a gesture showing how a glass was put on a table can
be a combination of a pantomime of the placing movement and a
hand-shape that indicates the shape of the object that is placed.
Gullberg (2011) has investigated language-specific gestures for
placement events. For a language, such as English and French,
that has only one main placement verb (‘put’ and ‘mettre’), a
native speaker only gestures the movement but not the shape
of the object that is being placed. In contrast, for a language,
such as Dutch and Swedish, that has several placement verbs
(corresponding to ‘set’, ‘stand’, and ‘lay’) that indicate the shape of
the object moved, a native speaker gestures both the movement
and the shape of the object.
Clark’s (2016) analysis of depiction has close similarities to
gestures. The examples he presents all seem to fall under the
property and action domains. He writes (ibid.) that “depicting
things is different from locating things”, which makes it clear
that the location domain is not included in depictions. (However,
bimanual gestures where one hand describes the location of
an object and the other the movement of the object are
not uncommon.) His distinction between ‘prop’ and ‘actor’
depictions (Clark’s 2016, p. 331) corresponds to my distinction
between gestures for objects properties and gestures for actions
(see Clark, 2016, p. 336) for the different kinds of ‘prop’
depictions). Therefore, my analysis of pantomime seems closely
related to Clark’s notion of actor depictions although he does not
consider the evolutionary roots of depiction.
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THE COGNITIVE MECHANISM OF
PANTOMIME
Mental Representation
My objective in this section is to outline how the mechanism
behind pantomime can be derived from more fundamental
cognitive capacities. First of all, it should be recalled that animals,
including humans, represent the world around them in different
ways. Following Humphrey (1993) and Gärdenfors (2003), the
different forms of mental representation can be divided into three
kinds.
(i) Sensations that are the immediate sensory impressions.
Our subjective world of experiences is based on sensations:
tastes, smells, colors, itches, pains, sensations of cold, sounds,
etc. (what philosophers of mind call qualia). They provide an
awareness of the world.
(ii) Perceptions that are interpreted sensory impressions.
The brain is full of mechanisms that contribute new
information to the sensory input. In particular, there are
many well-studied examples concerning the visual process. For
example, an object is perceived to have contours – they are part
of the information that the visual process constructs in order
to generate perceptions. The brain interprets the sensation and
constructs objects that stand out from a continuous visual influx.
(iii) Imaginations (or images) that are not directly generated
by sensory impressions.
Being able to use imaginations requires that one can suppress
the sensations one has for the moment; otherwise they will
come into conflict with the representation. Evoking a memory
of an event is a typical example of an imagination. Glenberg
(1997) says that imaginations put reality in quarantine. This
form of suppression is the basic mechanism behind pretense and
autocuing.
Planning Actions and Pantomime
Forming a plan involves representing different actions, that is,
different approaches to reaching a goal (Gulz, 1991). Jeannerod
(1994) argues that “actions are driven by an internally represented
goal rather than directly by the external world”. By exploiting its
capacity to imagine, the agent can simulate a number of different
actions in order to ‘see’ their consequences and to evaluate them
(Gärdenfors, 2003; Grush, 2004). After such simulations, the
agent can choose the most appropriate action to perform.
Hostetter and Alibali (2008) present their ‘gesture-as-
simulated-action’ framework as a mechanism to explain how
representational gestures emerge from perceptual and motor
simulations. They write that “an action generator is responsible
for planning the form of a gesture and this generator accesses
visuospatial images that are active in working memory”
(Hostetter and Alibali, 2008, p. 507). The mechanism I propose
here is compatible with their framework, but since I am mainly
concerned with pantomime, I focus on motor simulation and
want to explain how the action generator functions.
An important property of a simulator is that it does not need
to rely exclusively on the signals coming from sense organs: it
can also add on new types of information that can be useful in
simulating (Gärdenfors, 2004; Grush, 2004). It does not matter
much if the added information has no direct counterpart in the
surrounding world as long as the simulations produce the right
result, that is, lead to appropriate actions.
In particular, I submit that different kinds of simulators
produce variables that are used in causal reasoning. As has been
shown by Povinelli (2000) and others, monkeys and apes are
surprisingly restricted in their reasoning about physical causes
of phenomena. On the other hand, even very small human
children show strong signs of interpreting the world with the
aid of hidden forces and other causal variables. Gopnik (1998,
p. 104) claims that “other animals primarily understand causality
in terms of the effects of their own actions on the world. In
contrast, human beings combine that understanding with a
view that equates the causal power of their own actions and
those of objects independent of them”. Apparently, humans
have more advanced causal simulators than other animals (see
also Gärdenfors, 2003, section 2.8, and Woodward, 2011). The
forces involved are primarily physical, but can be metaphorically
extended to ‘mental’ forces involved in threats, persuasions, etc.
As I have discussed in previous sections, there seems to be
very limited, if any, evidence that other animals can demonstrate
or pantomime. My explanation for this is that only humans use
the force patterns of actions in their mental simulations and
are therefore able to represent actions via gestures. From this it
follows that pantomime involves character viewpoint gestures.
My explanation builds on the hypothesis that the human brain,
but not that of other species, adds forces as hidden variables in its
simulations of actions and their consequences (Runesson, 1994;
Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012). This explains why other species
do not pantomime.
A consequence of this thesis is that if you can show someone
else the relevant forces involved in an action, then this may
be sufficient for the addressee to understand which action you
are representing. Understanding the intention of a pantomime
is, however, cognitively more demanding than understanding a
demonstration. The meaning of a demonstration is clear as soon
as the addressee understands that it is performed in a teaching
context. For a pantomime, the addressee must also understand
that the teacher intends the pantomime to stand for a real action
and that the teacher intends the addressee to realize this. In
the following section this will be called the ‘communicative sign
function’.
The mechanism I propose for pantomime is thus that when
you want to show an action to someone – either for the purpose
of teaching the other individual how to perform the action or as
a part of a communicative act – you mentally extract the relevant
force patterns and perform them using your body. The upshot
is that if this mechanism works, then pantomime is sufficient
to communicate actions. A pantomime can therefore be seen
as a caricature of a demonstration. As mentioned earlier, the
pantomime can also be complemented with some props such as
the tools involved in the represented action. In contrast to a real
action (or a demonstration), the goal of a pantomime is not to
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achieve a real result in the world, but to make the addressee grasp
the appropriate forces involved in the action.
ENACTMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF
COMMUNICATION
The Mimesis Hierarchy
In this article my focus is on the use of demonstration and
pantomime in teaching and the evolutionary importance of these
methods. The analysis has, however, strong connections to the
evolution of communicative systems. Following Zlatev et al.
(2005a), I use the following criteria for distinguishing different
acts (communicative or of another type).
Cross-modality
The act involves a cross-modal mapping between proprioception
(kinesthetic experience) and exteroception (normally dominated
by vision).
This condition expresses that mimesis involves the body,
including specific parts such as the hand and the vocal tract.
According to the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman
and Mattingly, 1985) speech likewise involves such a cross-modal
mapping.
Volition
The act is realized by bodily motion that is, or can be, under
conscious control.
The condition expresses what Donald (2012) calls autocuing
with respect to bodily movements.
Representation
The motions involved in the act correspond to – either iconically
or indexically – some action, object or event, but at the same time
are differentiated from it by the agent.
As discussed in Section “The Structure of Pantomime”, having
access to the double world of pretense (Leslie, 1987) and
depiction (Clark, 2016) is necessary for representation.
Communicative Sign Function
The agent intends for the act to stand for some action, object or
event for an addressee, and for the addressee to realize this.
This criterion is related to Grice’s (1957) criterion of meaning,
but it is weaker since it only involves second order intention (the
agent intends that the addressee understand the communicative
intentions), but not third order (Gärdenfors, 2003, section 6.3;
Bar-On, 2013).
Symbolicity
The act is fully conventional, that is, a part of mutual knowledge,
and breaks up into meaningful sub-acts that relate systematically
to each other and to other similar acts.
On the basis of these criteria, Zlatev et al. (2005a) define a
‘mimesis hierarchy’ that is summarized in Table 1.
It should be noted that demonstrations do not exhibit the
communicative sign function, but they involve an intention
that the addressee imitates what is demonstrated. Hence
demonstration falls somewhere between dyadic and triadic
mimesis. Of the three examples of triadic mimesis in Table 1,
joint attention and declarative pointing are analyzed in
Zlatev et al. (2005a), but not pantomime. According to the
mimesis hierarchy, pantomime is triadic since it is cross-
modal, volitional, representational and it has a communicative
sign function. However, it is not conventional, even though
a repeated pantomime can quickly become a convention
within a community. In contrast, demonstrations never become
conventions.
Apes reach dyadic mimesis, but hardly triadic (joint attention
is contested, see Leavens and Racine, 2009). In contrast, triadic
mimesis in the forms of joint attention, declarative pointing and
pantomime appear early in the behavior of human children. As
regards intentional teaching, Strauss et al. (2002) show that three-
year-olds can teach by demonstration and that five-year-olds
can teach by explaining rules (levels 3 and 5, respectively, in
the analysis of Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017)). Together with
the criteria in Table 1, these observations suggest that triadic
mimesis, in form of the ability to demonstrate and pantomime
and the ability to engage in joint attention, is an early evolved
component of the human cognitive repertoire that distinguishes
us from that of other animals.
Triadic mimesis involves two key functions of mindreading
(theory of mind): Joint attention and understanding the
intentions of others (for the communicative sign function). It
is therefore likely that human mindreading capacity has been a
major driving force for the evolution of triadic mimesis (Zlatev
et al., 2005a,b). Since triadic mimesis is necessary for advanced
forms of cooperation (Brinck and Gärdenfors, 2003; Gärdenfors
et al., 2012) its role as a major step in the evolution of human
cognition is emphasized.
The Role of Pantomime in the Evolution
of Language
In my analysis, I have brought forth two main functions
for pantomime: The first is an invitation to copy – the
teaching function. The second is the communication function.
I submit that the teaching function is the more primitive. The
following quotation from McNeill (2013, section 5.3) supports
this position: “Natural gesture signals in modern apes have
an incipient action quality as well, the characteristic of which
is that an action is cut short and the action-stub becomes a
signifier; a kind of metonymy. The slow-to-emerge precursor
from 5 million years ago to 2 million years ago may have
built up a gesture language that derived from instrumental
actions as envisioned in gesture-first. It would have been an
evolution track leading to pantomime.” McNeill thus sees the
teaching function as the more primitive and the communicative
functions as a metonymical extension. This accords with my
position that pantomime is primarily a non-communicative
mechanism.
Returning to the communicative use of pantomime, I have
already noted that pantomime is displaced so that it can be
used to communicate about absent or future events. However,
pantomime is not conventional or symbolic. Nevertheless,
pantomime is a useful tool for planning cooperative actions
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TABLE 1 | The mimesis hierarchy.
Stage Definition Examples
Proto-mimesis A bodily act involving cross-modality with proprioception, but lacking
volition or representation (or both)
Facial expressions, bodily synchronization
Dyadic mimesis An interpersonal or intrapersonal bodily act displaying volition and
representation, but not communicative sign function
Shared attention, imperative pointing, mirror
self-recognition, do-as-I-do imitation
Triadic mimesis As dyadic mimesis but also involving communicative sign function Joint attention, declarative pointing, pantomime
Post-mimesis As triadic mimesis, but also involving symbolicity Sign language
Definitions of the four evolutionary stages and examples of corresponding types of acts.
FIGURE 1 | The position of pantomime in the evolution of hominin
cognition.
(Gärdenfors, 2013). Pantomime has been argued to be a
precursor to protosign and protolanguage (see Figure 1).
Arbib (2012, pp. 219–226) suggests that protosign develops by
conventionalization out of pantomime and other gestures. He
writes that “[p]antomime is not itself part of protosign but rather
a scaffolding for creating it” (Arbib, 2012, p. 224). However,
in its function as an invitation to copy, pantomime is also a
probable precursor to dance and ritual. These evolutionary paths,
which I will not follow here, further strengthen the centrality of
pantomime in the evolution of the human mind (see Figure 1).
Given my partitioning of gesture references into locations,
object properties and actions, these three categories of gestures
can be seen as protodemonstratives, protoadjectives, and
protoverbs. Gestures for nouns would typically develop out of
characteristic properties, but they may also emerge out of verbs.
My characterization of pantomime has been rather
narrowly confined to depicting actions. One may take a more
comprehensive perspective and take pantomime to encompass
the combination of gestures for actions with gestures for object
properties (or objects) and locations. Such an interpretation
seems to be intended by Zywiczynski et al. (2016, section 3.7),
who write that “pantomimic acts are ‘the size of ’ propositions
or utterances rather than smaller component units; rather than
being elements of a larger communicative whole, they express
complete, self-contained communicative acts”. This proposal is
consistent with Arbib’s (2012) idea that early communication
consisted of holophrases (see also Zlatev et al., unpublished).
On this broader account, pantomimes refer to events.
According to a cognitive semantic analysis of events (Gärdenfors
and Warglien, 2012; Warglien et al., 2012; Gärdenfors, 2014),
events consist of an action, normally performed by an agent, that
affects a patient and leads to a certain result. This theory builds
on conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000, 2014) where actions
are modeled as force vectors (or patterns) and results as vectors
describing change in some property of the patient. My hypothesis
is that in later stages of the evolution of communication, the
holophrases represented by a pantomime are broken down into
smaller semantic elements representing the components of the
event, that is, agent, patient, action and result (see Gärdenfors,
2014).
The way mothers talk to their children is called ‘Motherese’
or ‘child-directed speech’. Distinguishing features are that
the pitch of the voice is high and that the stresses are
exaggerated (Fernald, 1992). Motherese can be seen as a form
of ‘communicative demonstration’ where vowels, prosody and
pauses are exaggerated so that the infant with greater ease can
pick up the relevant meaning of what is communicated.
It is possible to express movement patterns via prosody.
For example, it is common to depict a falling object by a
vocal sound (or by music in cartoons) with falling pitch. In
this way, pantomime may have played a role in the evolution
of spoken language. In addition to a mapping between pitch
patterns and the force patterns of actions, Studdert-Kennedy
and Goldsmith (2003) argue that phonemes have a gestural
origin. Following MacNeilage (1998), they propose that the
mammalian capacities for sucking, licking and chewing have been
exapted as pantomimed gestures that have then evolved into
proto-syllables. To this they add that “[t]he initial impetus for
‘reuse’ of articulators (and so for the emergence of combinatorial
mechanisms) would then have come from the simple facts that
the articulators were few in number” (Studdert-Kennedy and
Goldsmith, 2003, p. 240).
CONCLUSION
The starting point of this article is that the crucial step separating
human teaching from that of other animals is ‘showing how to
do’. To improve our understanding of this evolutionary step,
I have provided a conceptual analysis of demonstration and
pantomime that are the two main forms of mimesis involved in
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showing how to do. I have proposed that pantomime develops out
of demonstration and that the primary objective of a pantomime
therefore is that the onlooker learns the motoric pattern shown
in the pantomime. Pantomime is often classified among gestures,
but I have argued that the communicative function of pantomime
is secondary to the instructional one.
My argument expands Donald’s (1991) idea of mimesis as
a key factor for the evolution of human cognition. He has
recently argued that language co-evolves with culture building
on distributed cognitive systems. He writes that there are
two preconditions for such systems: “a very general ability to
rehearse and refine skills (evident early in hominin evolution
in tool-making), and the emergence of material culture as an
external (to the brain) memory record that could retain and
accumulate knowledge across generations” (Donald, 2016, p. 1).
In accordance with the position taken here, he argues that skills
must have evolved before language.
As the complexity of technology and societal practices
increased over time, the challenges for new generations to
achieve knowledge about the manufacturing and use of tools,
food, medicine etc., also increase (see also Csibra and Gergely,
2011, p. 1154). This leads to greater evolutionary benefits
of demonstration for transmitting this kind of knowledge to
the next generation. An advanced material culture cannot
be preserved between generations without teaching. In brief,
innovations, of any kind, increase the demands for teaching.
As regards implications of demonstration and pantomime
for the evolution of language, an important question is why
the hominins (and not other species) had a demand for a
symbolic language that acted as a selective force. In earlier
publications, I have suggested that language is necessary for
the advanced forms of cooperation that have evolved along
the hominin line, namely, planning for future interaction and
indirect reciprocity (Gärdenfors et al., 2012; Gärdenfors, 2013).
Teaching should, however, also be seen as a form of cooperation
and the later stages in the model of Gärdenfors and Högberg
(2017) – communicating concepts and explaining relations
between concepts – require advanced forms of communication.
It is difficult to say which, if any, of these forms of cooperation
has been a dominating force behind the evolution of a
symbolic communication system. It is possible that all forms
have contributed to the evolution of human cognition and
communication. Pantomime is, however, a crucial step in the
evolution of any of these forms.
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